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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Scott Douglas Allred pled guilty to a single count
of felony DUI. He received a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. The
district court retained jurisdiction after which Mr. Allred was placed on probation. After a
second probation violation, the district court revoked Mr. Allred's probation and
Mr. Allred began serving his sentence in the penitentiary. On appeal, he contends that
the district court erred in revoking his probation and in failing to further reduce his
sentence. Further, Mr. Allred contends that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of
the June 10, 2009, jurisdictional review hearing.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
At approximately eight o'clock in the evening on October 17, 2008, a Boise police
officer pulled over a 1998 Pontiac Sunfire for having a taillight out.

(Presentence

Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.117.) The officer pulled over the vehicle and
made contact with the driver, who was identified as Scott D. Allred.

(PSI, p.2.)

Mr. Allred admitted to consuming alcohol earlier that evening and had a blood alcohol
concentration of greater than .08. (PSI, pp.2, 60; R., p.23.) Mr. Allred was charged by
information with felony DUI and misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R., pp.22-23.)
On November 13, 2008, Mr. Allred pled guilty to one count of felony DUI, and, in
exchange, the State dismissed the misdemeanor, driving without privileges charge.
(11/13/08 Tr., p.7, Ls.21-24; R., pp.24-25.)

Initially, there was a proposed plea

agreement in which the State agreed to limit its sentencing recommendations to two
1

years fixed, plus eight years indeterminate, and recommend that the sentence be
suspended and Mr. Allred placed on probation.

(11/13/08 Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, LA.)

However the State's offer was contingent on Mr. Allred only having three prior
misdemeanor DUls. (11/13/08 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Allred, prior to pleading guilty to
the charge, advised the court that he had additional prior DUI charges. 1 (11/13/08
Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.14, L.14.)

Thus Mr. Allred acknowledged that the State was no

longer obligated to follow the plea agreement. (11/13/08 Tr., p.15, L.i8 - p.16, L.6.)
Further, due to the fact that Mr. Allred had a significant mental health history, the
defense requested that Mr. Allred be considered for entry into the mental health court.
(11/13/08 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-20.)
The district court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation, a
substance abuse evaluation and a mental health evaluation.

(11/13/08 Tr., p.28, LS.5-

11; R., p.25.) Mr. Allred was sentenced by the district court on January 8, 2009. (See
generally 1/8/09 Tr.) Although Mr. Allred made an eloquent allocution, the district court

nevertheless sentenced Mr. Allred to ten years, with four years fixed, but retained
jurisdiction. (1/8/09 Tr., p.18, Ls.18-23; R., pp.30-32.) At sentencing, the district court
advised defense counsel that it would be open to placing Mr. Allred in mental health
court at the rider review hearing. 2

(1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.)

Mr. Allred was

Although the district court offered to set a new hearing date for Mr. Allred's guilty plea
in light of the additional prior DUls, Mr. Allred chose to plead guilty that day, after being
advised that the State would likely withdraw its plea offer. (11/13/08 Tr., p.15, LA ~.16, L.23.)
"THE COURT: So I want to advise you to put in your notes that this determination is
without prejudice for the defense to request that this court consider referral of the
defendant to the Mental Health Court after completion of the Rider because it may be
very beneficial to the defendant in maintaining." (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.)
1
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successful on his rider and on June 10, 2009, the district court placed him on probation
for six years.3 (R., pp.37, 39-45; 2/2/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.21-22.)
After nearly two full years on probation, a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation
Violation was filed on March 24, 2011. (R., ppA7-49; PSI, p.2.) Mr. Allred admitted that
he violated the conditions of his probation by: (1) consuming alcohol; (2) frequenting an
establishment where alcohol is the main source of income; (3) moving without
permission; and (4) failing to pay fines. (R., pp.62; PSI, p.2; 2/2/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25.)
After Mr. Allred admitted that he violated the terms of his probation, the district
court ordered an updated PSI, a substance abuse evaluation, and a mental health
evaluation.

(12/8/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.)

At disposition, the district court revoked

Mr. Allred's probation and executed the underlying sentence.

(R., pp.64-66; 2/2/12

Tr., p.25, LsA-6) In so doing, the district court, acting sua sponte under Idaho Criminal
Rule 35, reduced Mr. Allred's fixed time from four years to three and a half years, and
extended the indeterminate portion of Mr. Allred's sentence from six years to six and a
half years. (R., p.65; 2/2/12 Tr., p.25, LsA-11.) The district court gave Mr. Allred credit
for 317 days served. (R., p.65; 2/2/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.11-12, p.26, Ls.19-21.) Mr. Allred
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order of Revocation of Probation
and Reducing Sentence and Commitment. (R., pp.88-90.)
On appeal, Mr. Allred filed a motion to augment and suspend the briefing
schedule, wherein he requested that the record on appeal be augmented with the

3 The record on appeal is not clear as to whether a request for mental health court was
discussed at the rider review hearing. (R., pp.36-37.) Counsel for the appellant
requested that the record on appeal be augmented to include a transcript of the rider
review hearing; however, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the requested transcript as
discussed herein. Based on the PSI, it appears that Mr. Allred should have been
assessed for mental health court before being placed on probation due to his severe
mental health issues. (See generally, PSI.)

3

transcript of the rider review hearing on June 10, 2009.

(Motion to Augment and to

Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion
to Augment), pp.1-2.) The State objected to Mr. Allred's requests for the transcript,
claiming that Mr. Allred failed to demonstrate that the transcript was relevant.
(Objection to Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter,
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying Mr. Allred's motion. (Order Denying
Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p.1.)
Mr. Allred then moved the Idaho Supreme Court to reconsider its order denying
his motion to augment the record, arguing that denying Mr. Allred access to the
transcript violated his due process and equal protection rights. (Motion to Reconsider
Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule (Motion to
Reconsider), pp.1-7.) In his Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Allred identified the relevancy of
the requested transcript-the fact that previously, a discussion was held on the record
in which the district court advised defense counsel that it would consider a request to
get Mr. Allred into mental health court as Mr. Allred's mental health issues might
otherwise inhibit his ability to be successful on probation. 4 (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.)
The State objected to Mr. Allred's Motion to Reconsider, stating as its basis that "Allred
has still failed to demonstrate that the requested transcript is relevant to the resolution
of any issue over which the appellate court has jurisdiction." (Objection to Motion to
Reconsider Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing

The district court thereby was aware of the potential for Mr. Allred to have difficulty
meeting the terms of probation without additional assistance in managing his mental
illness. These circumstances should have been further considered by the district court
when the court revoked Mr. Allred's probation on February 2, 2012.
4

4

Schedule, p.1.) The Court denied Mr. Allred's Motion to Reconsider on October 31,
2012. (Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Order, pp.1-2.)
Mr. Allred contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to place him back on probation and by failing to further reduce his sentence, sua
sponte. Mr. Allred further argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process

and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of the June
10, 2009, jurisdictional review hearing Mr. Allred requested to be created at the public's
expense.

5

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Allred's probation
and executed his underlying sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, and by
not further reducing Mr. Allred's sentence upon revoking his probation?

2.

Was Mr. Allred denied due process and equal protection when the Idaho
Supreme Court denied his requests to augment the record on appeal with a
necessary transcript?

6

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Allred's Probation And
Executed His Sentence

A.

Introduction
Mr. Allred asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation and executed his original sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, only
reducing the sentence, sua sponte, to three and one-half years fixed, and six and onehalf years indeterminate.

He asserts that the violations did not justify revoking

probation, especially in light of the goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection
of society could be best served by his continued supervision under the probation
department. However, even if Mr. Allred's violations justified revoking his probation, the
district court abused its discretion by not further reducing his sentence sua sponte.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Allred's Probation
And Executed His Sentence
In light of the significant progress Mr. Allred made while on probation, his

probation violations did not justify revoking probation.

In a probation revocation

proceeding, the district court addresses three issues: First, was a condition of probation
violated? Second, does the violation justify revocation? Finally, if probation is revoked,
what prison sentence should be imposed?

State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529

(Ct. App. 2001). As to the first issue before the district court, Mr. Allred concedes that
he violated conditions of his probation as he admitted he had done so. (12/8/11 Tr., p.8,
L.24 - p.10, L.1.)

Mr. Allred took full responsibility for violating the terms of his

probation. (2/2/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.20-21.)

7

When a defendant violates any of the terms of probation, the decision to revoke
probation rests within the sound discretion of the district court.
Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993).

State v. Jones, 123

Mr. Allred asserts that the district court abused its

discretion in finding that his probation violations justified revocation. The district court
must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether
probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Phillips, 113 Idaho 176,
177 (Ct. App. 1987). Mr. Allred asserts that his continued probation would achieve the
goals of his rehabilitation and the protection of society.
Although Mr. Allred's violations were serious, they did not justify revoking his
probation.

Mr. Allred admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by drinking

alcohol at a bar and not paying his fines as required. (12/8/11 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.1 0, L.1.)
Mr. Allred also admitted that he did not obtain his probation officer's written permission
prior to moving out of his residence. (12/8/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.15-21.) However, Mr. Allred
enjoyed great successes while on probation. He began rebuilding his relationship with
his son, Taylor, and he stayed sober for a substantial period of time while on probation.
(2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20; PSI, p.14.)

In fact, Mr. Allred was clean and sober for

almost two years, from October 2008 to August 2010, prior to having his probation
revoked. (2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20; R., pA8.) Mr. Allred's intentions are good, and it
should be noted that the road to recovery is not an easy one; Mr. Allred was clean for
almost two years but relapsed.

(2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.)

While on probation

Mr. Allred put forth an immense effort to stop drinking, but, after 21-22 months of
sobriety, Mr. Allred relapsed - as is not entirely uncommon for someone who is an
alcoholic.

(2/2/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.)

While on probation, Mr. Allred made great

strides to live a healthy, non-criminal life. Mr. Allred moved in with his 19 year old son,

8

and did not commit any new crimes. (2/2/12 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.3; R., pp.47 -49.)
He noted that he actually felt like he was living a "normal" life for the first time in over ten
years. (PSI, p.9.)
Assuming arguendo the district court was justified in revoking Mr. Allred's
probation, it should have further reduced his sentence.

The third question to be

answered in a probation revocation proceeding, is what prison sentence should be
imposed? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). In answering this third
question, the appellate courts examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v.
Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Allred does not allege that his sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion,
Mr. Allred must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Allred has not had an easy life. Mr. Allred had back-to-back DUls at the age
of 19, after his father died. (PSI, p.34.) Mr. Allred has been chronically homeless since
2004. (PSI, p.34.) Mr. Allred struggles to provide for himself and has had an especially
difficult time in the last several years. (PSI, p.34.) On the evening that he received the
underlying DUI charge in this case, Mr. Allred was living in his car after recently being
discharged from State Hospital South. (PSI, p.61.) Mr. Allred planned to drive his car
six blocks to an alley he had previously been parking in to sleep for the night. (PSI,
p.61.) Mr. Allred, prior to his incarceration for the probation violation, had been living in

9

transitional housing, living with friends, or living in his car.

(PSI, p.34.) Just before

being arrested on the most recent probation violation, Mr. Allred had been living with his
son for nine months-his first real home since 2004.

(PSI, p.34.)

Mr. Allred was

enjoying finally having a home and also had a cat. (PSI, p.34.) Notably, the mental
health evaluator described Mr. Allred as "quite organized and intelligent and quite
philosophicaL" (PSI, p.35.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when it imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89 (1982).

In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on

Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem."
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and

alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,414 (1981). The majority of
Mr. Allred's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, p.34.)
Mr. Allred has been using alcohol since he was fourteen years old. (PSI, pp.21, 33.)
When his mental health medication is not working and he is depressed, Mr. Allred tends
to "self-medicate" with alcohol. (PSI, p.61.) Mr. Allred recognizes that he has a pattern
of using alcohol to cope when he receives bad news such as the death of a family
member or loss of a job opportunity. (1/8/09 Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.22.)
Another aspect that should have received the attention of the district court is the
fact that Mr. Allred has strong support from his friends and family.

See State v.

Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the
10

support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Allred's best friend
for many years, Tracy Smith, is very supportive of him and wrote a letter to the court on
Mr. Allred's behalf. (PSI, pp.7, 14.) Ms. Smith describes Mr. Allred as a "devoted and
wonderful father" who is rebuilding his relationships with his children.

(PSI, p.14.)

Mr. Allred's 19 year old son, Taylor, was present at Mr. Allred's probation violation
disposition to show his support of his father. (2/2/12 Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.10.) All
three of Mr. Allred's children wrote letters to the court on his behalf. (PSI, pp.67, 99101.) Further, Mr. Allred moved out of the River of Life shelter in order to live with his
son with whom he was in the process of reuniting.

(PSI, p.14.) One of Mr. Allred's

goals is "[t]o be the best father I can be to the greatest children anyone could hope for."
(PSI, p.71.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.
HoI/on v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Allred's mental illnesses substantially

contributed to his current situation. Mr. Allred suffers from PTSD, bipolar disorder, type
II, narcissistic personality tendencies, severe depression, and has a history offour prior
psychiatric hospitalizations. 5 (12/8/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-20; PSI, pp.33, 36.) Mr. Allred has
a long history of chronic depression. 6 (PSI, p.35.) Mr. Allred recognizes that he selfmedicates with alcohol.

(2/2/12 Tr., p.21, Ls.23-24.)

Mr. Allred believes that he

resumes drinking after disappointing or traumatic life events such as the death of his
father. (PSI, p.33.) He knows that his mental health and incidents of alcohol abuse are

Mr. Allred's most recent hospitalization at State Hospital South was from December
2007 to April 14, 2008. (PSI, p.33.) Mr. Allred was hospitalized after being placed on a
police hold for being intoxicated and suicidal in November 2007. (PSI, p.33.)
5

11

linked together, i.e., Mr. Allred uses alcohol to excess in an attempt to cope with
stressful situations.

(1/8/09, p.1?, Ls.20-22.)

To handle periods of high emotional

stress, Mr. Allred drinks alcohol, which in turn exacerbates his depression. (PSI, pp.33,
70.) For example, Mr. Allred recently trained to be certified as a peer specialist in the
mental health field, but found out, after spending a considerable amount of time of
working on the certificate, that his felony conviction would preclude him from
certification. (PSI, pp.10, 33.) Upon learning this disappointing news, Mr. Allred drank
alcohol as a coping mechanism. (PSI, p.33.) Tellingly, Mr. Allred's most recent relapse
coincided with him ceasing to take the medications prescribed to him in order to
manage his mental health problems. (PSI, p.8.)
Mr. Allred was in the Marine Corps for four years. (2/2/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18.)
The Nice court found the defendant's honorable discharge from the military to be a
factor in mitigation of sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,90 (1982). In Mr. Allred's
case, he was a Marine for four years, but was discharged when he was caught with
drug paraphernalia. (2/2/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-22; PSI, p.34.)
Further, Mr. Allred has shown remorse for his conduct and taken full
responsibility for violating the terms of his probation. (2/2/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-19, p.20,
LS.20-21, p.22, Ls.7-10.)

Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a

defendant expresses remorse for his conduct.

State v. A/betts, 121 Idaho 204, 209

(Ct. App. 1991).
One Idaho case which addressed the issue of reducing a sentence where a
defendant recognizes that he has a problem and expresses remorse was State v.

Mr. Allred reported that his depressive symptoms can last up to two months and
include: increased anxiety, difficulty sleeping, hopelessness, feelings of helplessness
as well as suicidal ideation. (PSI, p.35.)
6
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Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991). In Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted

that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his
conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other
positive attributes of his character."
alcoholic.

Id. at 209.

(1/8/09 Tr., p.16, Ls.11-12.)

Mr. Allred admitted that he is an

However, Mr. Allred was successful on

probation for almost two years and demonstrated that he can lead a sober life. (2/2/12
Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Allred is committed to changing. (2/2/12 Tr., p.15, L.17.) At
sentencing, Mr. Allred adamantly told the court that he would never again drive under
the influence?

(2/2/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-15.) Further, Mr. Allred wrote that he should

have sought help from probation and parole instead of using alcohol and noted that, "I
ruined my life again by violating my probation. I could not feel worse as my decision
affected not only me, but my son." (PSI, p.3.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant's term of imprisonment
because the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's
recovery from his poor mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent
outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling
that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly
weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Id. at 594-95.
Therefore, the court reduced Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to
exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593.

"But for your edification, Mr. Prosecutor, I touched that stove of driving under the
influence nine times, and I will never touch it again. That will never happen again."
(2/2/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-1S.)
7
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Like Shideler, Mr. Allred has mental health problems, but also exhibited considerable
remorse for his actions and truly desires to change his life.
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Mr. Allred's significant rehabilitative potential, the district court
abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Allred's probation.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Further Reduce
Mr. Allred's Sentence Upon Revoking His Probation
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Allred's

probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing his sentence sua sponte
pursuant to Rule 35.

When the district court decides to resume the execution of a

previously suspended sentence, as it does when it revokes probation, it also has the
authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. State v. Timbana,
145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008).
After a probation violation has been established, the district court may order the
suspended sentence to be executed, but the court is also authorized under Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence.

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27

(Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are
the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.
Thus the district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing
objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the record. See id. Therefore, for all the
reasons discussed in Section (B), supra, the district court abused its discretion by not
reducing Mr. Allred's sentence sua sponte, even if only in recognition of his successful
efforts on probation to that point.
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II.

Mr. Allred Was Denied Due Process And Equal Protection When The Idaho
Supreme Court Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With A Necessary
Transcript

A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent defendant
access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues the defendant
intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally deny an indigent
defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is
irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Allred filed two requests to augment the record with a transcript
of Mr. Allred's rider review hearing held on June 10, 2009. The State twice objected
and this Court twice denied Mr. Allred's motions. On appeal, Mr. Allred is challenging
the Idaho Supreme Court's denials of his request for the transcript of the rider review
hearing held on June 10, 2009.

Mr. Allred asserts that the requested transcript is

relevant to the issues addressed at the probation revocation hearing because
Mr. Allred's performance on probation was directly and negatively affected by his mental
health issues. (See PSI, pp.8, 10, 33-35,61, 70; 1/8/09 Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22; 2/2/12
Tr., p.21, Ls.23-24.)
At Mr. Allred's sentencing on January 8, 2009, the district court advised defense
counsel that it would be open to placing Mr. Allred in mental health court at the rider
review hearing.

(1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-17.)

The court stated that it believed that

mental health court would be beneficial to Mr. Allred to help him by "maintaining," by
which the court presumably meant that mental health court would be beneficial to
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Mr. Allred by helping him either maintain his sobriety or maintain his mental health while
on probation.

The record has not been established as to whether that request was

restated at the rider review hearing or whether Mr. Allred's mental health was discussed
at that time.

As the district court had evidence before it relating to the connection

between Mr. Allred's mental health and alcohol use when it dispositioned Mr. Allred,
information or discussions relating to Mr. Allred's mental health are relevant to the
circumstances surrounding the court's decision not to reinstate Mr. Allred on probation
or further reduce his sentence due to his severe mental illness. Therefore, the Idaho
Supreme Court denied Mr. Allred due process and equal protection by denying his
request for the June 10, 2009 transcript.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court exercises free review in determining whether the constitutional

requirements of due process have been satisfied.

State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296

(Ct. App. 2003).

C.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Allred Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcript
The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art.

I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
16

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant has a statutory right to appeal. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense.
rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of

transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further,

"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appel/ate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. See Griffin v. Illinois 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that in order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective merits-related appel/ate review); see also Burns v. Ohio,
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360 U.S. 252 (1959) ("[o]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal
cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty."). However, the second theme limits the states' obligationthe states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all
of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. See State v. Draper, 372 U.S.
487 (1963) ("[p]art or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be
germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its
funds unnecessarily in such circumstances."); see also Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971) (holding that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal, then it becomes the State's
burden to prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal).
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
Here, the requested item falls within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review.
The transcript of the rider review hearing is relevant because Idaho appellate courts
review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court
appropriately revoked probation. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App.
2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was
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imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation
of probation.") (emphasis added).8
As set forth in appellant's Motion to Reconsider, appellate counsel for Mr. Allred
requested an additional item necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal. The
substance of the June 10, 2009, rider review hearing is not known to appellate counsel,
as the minutes provided in the record do not indicate whether Mr. Allred's admission
into mental health court was discussed.

(R., pp.36-37.)

However, the district court,

prior to sentencing Mr. Allred to a rider on January 8, 2009, recognized that Mr. Allred
had significant mental health issues, and advised Mr. Allred's counsel that he could ask
the court to "consider referral of the defendant to the Mental Health Court after
completion of the Rider because it may be very beneficial to the defendant in
maintaining [his sobriety]." (1/8/09 Tr., p.20, Ls. 11-17.) However, the minutes of the
June 10, 2009 rider review hearing are not clear as to whether defense counsel
requested a referral for Mr. Allred to mental health court, whether the court or Mr. Allred
himself raised the issue of mental health court, or whether any discussion was had at a/l
regarding Mr. Allred's mental health. (R., pp.36-37.)
According to the minutes of the June 10, 2009, hearing, Mr. Allred addressed the
court; the statement he made may have had some impact on the district court's decision
to revoke probation in 2012, which is also an issue on appeal.

(R., pp.36-37.)

8But see State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 pA, (Ct. App. 2012) (not
yet final) (holding that not "aI/ proceedings in the trial court up to and including
sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial
court's decision to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are
properly made part of the record on appeal."). However, in Mr. Allred's case, as
required by Morgan, "new evidence [wa]s presented in support of a renewed motion" as
appellant filed a motion to reconsider with additional evidence as to the importance and
relevance of the transcript. Id. at p.3.
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Mr. Allred had a history of non-compliance with his mental health medications, after
which he would typically relapse into using alcohol as a means to "self-medicate" his
severe depression. (See PSI, p.8.) As Mr. Allred had stopped taking his mental health
medications at the time of his probation violations (PSI, p.8), any statements he made to
the district court regarding his mental health would be relevant to the district court's
decision to revoke Mr. Allred's probation.

Without access to the transcript of the

June 10, 2009, evidentiary hearing Mr. Allred is unable to address on appeal whether
the district court erred in not further considering Mr. Allred's mental health when it
revoked his probation.
In sum, the decision to deny Mr. Allred's request for the transcript will render his
appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript supports the
district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of
Mr. Allred's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Allred should
either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption should not be
applied.
D.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Allred With Access To The Requested Transcript, The
Court Has Denied Him The Opportunity To Receive Effective Assistance Of
Counsel On Appeal
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme

Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
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In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of

Douglas was clarified as being the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court, if counsel is to be effective,
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967), held that the constitutional requirements of sUbstantial equality and fair process
"can only be attained where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client ..
. . [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he support his client's interest's to the best
of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this
case, the lack of access to the requested transcripts has prevented appellate counsel
from making a conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented
appellate counsel from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise, or
whether there is factual support either in favor of any argument made or undercutting an
argument. Therefore, Mr. Allred has not obtained full review of the trial proceedings
based on the merits and has been deprived of an opportunity to receive effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate counsel neither
can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal,
nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's
decision to relinquish Mr. Allred's probation. Counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Allred
on the probable role the transcript may play in the appeal.
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Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental
briefing raiSing issues which arise as a result of that review.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Allred respectfully requests that this Court place him back on probation.
Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
probation violation disposition hearing.

Alternatively, Mr. Allred asks this Court to

further reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 8th day of November, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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